Dell Digital Delivery - CVE-2018-11072 - Local Privilege Escalation

Back in March or April I began reversing a slew of Dell applications installed on a laptop I had. Many of them had privileged services or processes running and seemed to perform a lot of different complex actions. I previously disclosed a LPE in SupportAssist[0], and identified another in their Digital Delivery platform. This post will detail a Digital Delivery vulnerability and how it can be exploited. This was privately discovered and disclosed, and no known active exploits are in the wild. Dell has issued a security advisory for this issue, which can be found here[4].

I’ll have another follow-up post detailing the internals of this application and a few others to provide any future researchers with a starting point. Both applications are rather complex and expose a large attack surface. If you’re interested in bug hunting LPEs in large C#/C++ applications, it’s a fine place to begin.

Dell’s Digital Delivery[1] is a platform for buying and installing system software. It allows users to purchase or manage software packages and reinstall them as necessary. Once again, it comes “..preinstalled on most Dell systems."[1]


The Digital Delivery service runs as SYSTEM under the name DeliveryService, which runs the DeliveryService.exe binary. A userland binary, DeliveryTray.exe, is the user-facing component that allows users to view installed applications or reinstall previously purchased ones.

Communication from DeliveryTray to DeliveryService is performed via a Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) named pipe. If you’re unfamiliar with WCF, it’s essentially a standard methodology for exchanging data between two endpoints[2]. It allows a service to register a processing endpoint and expose functionality, similar to a web server with a REST API.

For those following along at home, you can find the initialization of the WCF pipe in Dell.ClientFulfillmentService.Controller.Initialize:

this._host = WcfServiceUtil.StandupServiceHost(typeof(UiWcfSession),

This invokes Dell.NamedPipe.StandupServiceHost:

ServiceHost host = null;
string apiUrl = "net.pipe://localhost/DDDService/IClientFulfillmentPipeService";
Uri realUri = new Uri("net.pipe://localhost/" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString());
  host = new ServiceHost(classType, new Uri[]
  host.AddServiceEndpoint(interfaceType, WcfServiceUtil.CreateDefaultBinding(), string.Empty);
}, null, null);
AuthenticationManager.Singleton.RegisterEndpoint(apiUrl, realUri.AbsoluteUri);

The endpoint is thus registered and listening and the AuthenticationManager singleton is responsible for handling requests. Once a request comes in, the AuthenticationManager passes this off to the AuthPipeWorker function which, among other things, performs the following authentication:

string execuableByProcessId = AuthenticationManager.GetExecuableByProcessId(processId);
bool flag2 = !FileUtils.IsSignedByDell(execuableByProcessId);
if (!flag2)

If the process on the other end of the request is backed by a signed Dell binary, the request is allowed and a connection may be established. If not, the request is denied.

I noticed that this is new behavior, added sometime between 3.1 (my original testing) and 3.5 (latest version at the time, 3.5.1001.0), so I assume Dell is aware of this as a potential attack vector. Unfortunately, this is an inadequate mitigation to sufficiently protect the endpoint. I was able to get around this by simply spawning an executable signed by Dell (DeliveryTray.exe, for example) and injecting code into it. Once code is injected, the WCF API exposed by the privileged service is accessible.

The endpoint service itself is implemented by Dell.NamedPipe, and exposes a dozen or so different functions. Those include:


Digital Delivery calls application install packages “entitlements”, so the references to installation/reinstallation are specific to those packages either available or presently installed.

One of the first functions I investigated was ReInstallEntitlement, which allows one to initiate a reinstallation process of an installed entitlement. This code performs the following:

private static void ReInstallEntitlementThreadStart(object reInstallArgs)
    PipeServiceClient.ReInstallArgs ra = (PipeServiceClient.ReInstallArgs)reInstallArgs;
        PipeServiceClient._commChannel.ReInstall(ra.EntitlementId, ra.RunAsUser);
    }, string.Concat(new object[]
        "ReInstall ",
        " ",

This builds the arguments from the request and invokes a WCF call, which is sent to the WCF endpoint. The ReInstallEntitlement call takes two arguments: an entitlement ID and a RunAsUser flag. These are both controlled by the caller.

On the server side, Dell.ClientFulfillmentService.Controller handles implementation of these functions, and OnReInstall handles the entitlement reinstallation process. It does a couple sanity checks, validates the package signature, and hits the InstallationManager to queue the install request. The InstallationManager has a job queue and background thread (WorkingThread) that occasionally polls for new jobs and, when it receives the install job, kicks off InstallSoftware.

Because we’re reinstalling an entitlement, the package is cached to disk and ready to be installed. I’m going to gloss over a few installation steps here because it’s frankly standard and menial.

The installation packages are located in C:\ProgramData\Dell\DigitalDelivery\Downloads\Software\ and are first unzipped, followed by an installation of the software. In my case, I was triggering the installation of Dell Data Protection - Security Tools v1.9.1, and if you follow along in procmon, you’ll see it startup an install process:

"C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _
Security Tools v1.9.1\STSetup.exe" -y -gm2 /S /z"\"CIRRUS_INSTALL,

The run user for this process is determined by the controllable RunAsUser flag and, if set to False, runs as SYSTEM out of the %ProgramData% directory.

During process launch of the STSetup process, I noticed the following in procmon:

C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\VERSION.dll
C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\UxTheme.dll
C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\PROPSYS.dll
C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\apphelp.dll
C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\Secur32.dll
C:\ProgramData\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software\Dell Data Protection _ Security Tools v1.9.1\api-ms-win-downlevel-advapi32-l2-1-0.dll

Of interest here is that the parent directory, %ProgramData%\Dell\Digital Delivery\Downloads\Software is not writable by any system user, but the entitlement package folders, Dell Data Protection - Security Tools in this case, is.

This allows non-privileged users to drop arbitrary files into this directory, granting us a DLL hijacking opportunity.


Exploiting this requires several steps:

  1. Drop a DLL under the appropriate %ProgramData% software package directory
  2. Launch a new process running an executable signed by Dell
  3. Inject C# into this process (which is running unprivileged in userland)
  4. Connect to the WCF named pipe from within the injected process
  5. Trigger ReInstallEntitlement

Steps 4 and 5 can be performed using the following:

PipeServiceClient client = new PipeServiceClient();

while (PipeServiceClient.AppState == AppState.Initializing)

EntitlementUiWrapper entitle = PipeServiceClient.EntitlementList[0];
PipeServiceClient.ReInstallEntitlement(entitle.ID, false);


The classes used above are imported from NamedPipe.dll. Note that we’re simply choosing the first entitlement available and reinstalling it. You may need to iterate over entitlements to identify the correct package pointing to where you dropped your DLL.

I’ve provided a PoC on my Github here[3], and Dell has additionally released a security advisory, which can be found here[4].


05/24/18 - Vulnerability initially reported
05/30/18 - Dell requests further information
06/26/18 - Dell provides update on review and remediation
07/06/18 - Dell provides internal tracking ID and update on progress
07/24/18 - Update request
07/30/18 - Dell confirms they will issue a security advisory and associated CVE
08/07/18 - 90 day disclosure reminder provided
08/10/18 - Dell confirms 8/22 disclosure date alignment
08/22/18 - Public disclosure


[0] [1] [2] [3] [4]